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RECENT CASES
COURTS-FEDERAL COURT REJECTS RECENT DICTUM OF STATE
SuFREiE COURT AND FINDS STATE LAW To BE As DECARED IN
OLDER LowER STATE COURT HoLDINGS
Shortly before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit' held
that a wrongful death action brought in 1958 by the decedent's widow
and minor child upon facts that occurred in California in 1953 was barred
under the California statute of limitations,2 the California Supreme Court
declared by way of dictum that the disability of one of the parties to a joint
cause of action tolls the statute as to both.8 The Supreme Court of the
United States set aside the dismissal of the action and remanded the case
for reconsideration in the light of this dictum. 4 On remand, the court of
appeals adhered to its former decision, holding that California law would
still bar a minor child's cause of action for wrongful death where that of
the parent is barred by limitation, notwithstanding the dictum of the
highest court of California. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 290 F.2d
904 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 901 (1961).
When jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the federal
court is bound to apply the law of the state in which it sits, 5 in this case
New York law. New York, in turn, under its "borrowing statute," applies
the statute of limitations prescribed by the state "where the cause of action
arose," 1 as well as its tolling provisions and its rules on infancy.7 In
the instant case, the court of appeals was required to ascertain whether the
California Supreme Court would now adhere to its own 1959 dictum or
would follow the direct holdings of its intermediate appellate courts from
the 1930's.8

In the years following the landmark decision of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,9 the Supreme Court dictated a rigid standard for federal judges in
the determination of state law for diversity cases. Fidelity Union Trust

I Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280 (Zd Cit. 1960), afflrming 173 F.
Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
2 CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 340 (3), applicable by virtue of N.Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT § 13.
s Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 209, 347 P.2d 12, 22, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12, 22
(1959) (dictum).
4 Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293 (1961).
5Erie R.R. v. Tomplins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
6 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 13.

7 See American Sur. Co. v. Gainfort, 219 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1955).
8Haro v. Southern Pac. R.R., 17 Cal. App. 2d 594, 62 P.2d 441 (Dist. Ct. App.
1936) ; Sears v. Majors, 104 Cal. App. 60, 285 Pac. 321 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930).
9 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Co. v. Field -o held that a federal court in New Jersey was bound to follow

a decision of the New Jersey Court of Chancery, a trial court of statewide
jurisdiction, "in the absence of more convincing evidence of what the state
law is." 11 Arguments that the chancery court decision had construed a
state statute nearly out of existence and that the decision was unsound
and might not be followed by appellate courts or by the chancery court
itself were rejected by the Court in the absence of higher New Jersey
authority. Field and three other 1940 cases 12 similarly confining federal
judges to lower court holdings of questionable merit were roundly criticized
by commentators; it was charged that they drastically limited the scope of
examination of state law and encouraged forum-shopping by preventing
uniform treatment of the same legal rights in state and federal courts.' 3
Fears engendered by the 1940 cases that the federal courts would be
forced to accord disproportionate respect to local trial court decisions
were allayed in 1948 when the Supreme Court held that a federal diversity
court need not follow a holding of a South Carolina county court whose
decisions were not reported and did not constitute precedents in that court
or any other court of the state.' 4 More recently, the Court has asserted
that a line of state decisions is not necessarily determinative of the applicable state law if confusion, doubts, ambiguities, or opposing dicta are
found in the state opinions, or a developing line of authorities casts doubt
on established holdings, or legislative development promises to undermine
the judicial rule.' 5 Accordingly, a district court sitting in Iowa examined
the Restatement, periodicals, trends in other jurisdictions, and "considered"
dicta in the state opinions to ascertain the local rule on recovery for death
of an unborn infant.16 It thus appears that the federal courts are moving
in the direction urged by commentators that all relevant data which the
state court itself would be free to use, including the state constitution,
statutes, opinions from other states, juristic writings, and the mores of the
community, be considered. 17 This widened scope of judicial creativity must
10311 U.S. 169 (1940).
11 Id. at 178.
2
1 Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940); West v. American

Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Six Companies v. Joint Highway Dist., 311

U.S. 180 (1940).

13 Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie
v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 290-95 (1946); Corbin, The Laws of the Several
States, 50 YALs L.J. 762 (1941) ; Note, How a Federal Court Determines State Law,

59 HAv. L. REv. 1299 (1946).
14 King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
15 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956) (dictum). This case

has been called an "invitation to federal court judges to play a more meaningful role
in the development and application of state law .

.

.

."

45 CALr. L. REv. 87, 90

(1957).
'6Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960). See idso Strubbe v.
Sonnenschein, No. 26906, 2d Cir., Jan. 26, 1962.
17 See, e.g., M. H. Cardozo, Choosing and Declaring State Law: Deference to
State Courts' Versus*Federal Respoissibility, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 419 (1960) ; Corbin,
supra note 13, at 770-72.
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still be exercised in the framework of the diversity jurisdiction. The Erie
ideal of uniformity of decision in each state demands that these data be
used in the same manner in which the highest state court would use them.",
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the weight to be given dicta
of the highest state courts; 19 by its remand of the instant case it indicated
a willingness to leave this question to the discretion of the inferior federal
courts. The courts of appeals have taken different approaches to state
pronouncements not necessary to decision. For example, the Fourth
Circuit in 1941 refused to recognize dicta as evidence of state law, declaring that "speculation as to what the local court might decide in the light
of dicta, would be to depart from our solemn duty in the premises and
embark upon a vain and illusory enterprise." 20 In the view of the Eighth
Circuit, however, "the obligation to accept local interpretation extends not
merely to definitive decisions, but to considered dicta as well." 21 The
latter court held in 1942 that dicta of the Supreme Court of Missouri
should prevail over prior holdings of intermediate appellate courts.22 The
instant case comes to the opposite conclusion; it is significant for its
refusal to take a doctrinaire stand on the relative weights to be ascribed to
dicta and holdings, for its avoidance of a conclusion based solely on the
level of the state court or the recency of a particular judicial expression,
and for its identification and weighing of extrinsic factors to be considered
in resolving a holding-dictum controversy.
Forced by the nature of the case before it to look at California law
through the eyes of the New York Court of Appeals, 23 the court may
have felt reluctant to play the creative role that a federal court might play
in the development of state law.2 Since the intervention of the law of
New York consisted only of its "borrowing statute," the task of the Court
of Appeals was essentially that of a federal court sitting in California. But
18
See King v. Order of Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 157-58, 161 (1948) ;
Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 345-46 (D. Mass. 1951). However, since a
federal judge's determination of the weight which a state court would give to such
criteria will often be conjectural, perhaps he should not, in veneration of the uniformity
ideal, allow a hypothetical state methodology to lead him to an unsound result.

19 See 11 ARK. L. REv. 456, 458 (1957).
2
0 New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 118 F.2d 414, 420 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 629 (1941). See also Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hallatt, 295 F.2d
64 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Continental Cas. Co. -v. Ohio Edison Co., 126 F.2d 423 (6th Cir.
1942); Delong v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 585 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 635 (1940).
21
Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 117 F2d 488, 489 (8th Cir. 1941) ; see Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Mutual Benefit Health & Acc.
Ass'n v. Cohen, 194 F2d 232 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 965 (1952) ; 1 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 10.307(2), at 3312 (2d ed. 1960).
22 Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Meinsen, 131 F.2d 176 (8th Cir.
1942), cited with approval in Note, upra note 13, at 1304.
23
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
24
See, e.g., HART & WEcEsIER, TE FEDERAL COURTS AND
628-30 (1953); notes 17, 18 supra and accompanying text.
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the Second Circuit's unfamiliarity with the practice and policy of California
law may have inclined it to deal conservatively with the law of that state.
Yet the existence of a recent dictum of the California Supreme Court
freed it from any compulsion to follow an otherwise conclusive, but possibly
25
outmoded, line of California decisions.
The first factor examined was the respect which the local judiciary
accords to nonessential judicial statements, the New York valuation being
properly subordinated to that of California. 26 A more important consideration than general views on dicta was the court's finding that the
particular dictum in issue was neither "considered" nor "relevant" as
the Supreme Court had characterized it. The statement that, "if the
cause of action were a joint one, the statute would be tolled as to both,"
was made by the California Supreme Court in Leeper v. Beltrami,2 7 where
the disability urged to toll the statute was imprisonment, not infancy, and
the cause of action was not joint. The effect of disability of one joint
plaintiff was not argued before the California court, and the cases which
the dictum was said to have cast in doubt-Sears v. Majors 28 and Haro
v. Southern Pac. R.R.,9 holding that an action barred as to one joint
plaintiff is barred as to the other-were not cited.30 In deciding to reject
the dictum, the court relied most heavily on the legislative policy which
is evidently embodied in California's short period of limitations for personal injuries and wrongful death actions,31 and on a significant distinction
between the disability involved in Leeper and that invoked in the instant
case: no joint cause of action can be sued upon in California while one of
the parties is imprisoned,3 2 but the widow in the instant case could have
25 See Note, supra note 13, at 1303-05. In Mason v. American Emery Wheel
Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 815 (1957), application by

the district court of a 1928 Mississippi decision barring recovery against a negligent
manufacturer in the absence of privity of contract was held improper in view of a
recent expression by the highest state court that it was prepared to abandon the rule.
This decision has been cited as an example of a federal court "sitting, not as 'another
court of the state,' but actually determining and applying law as the highest court
of the state would determine it." 11 ARx. L. IrZv. 456, 458 (1957) ; see 28 Miss. L.J.

238 (1957).
2
6Instant case at 906. The opinion may have underrated the use of dicta in
both states. Despite a citation to criticism by Judge Cardozo, New York judges
have been known to "put their faith in dicta." See, e.g., In the Matter of Will of
Weeks, 294 N.Y. 516, 63 N.E.2d 85 (1945).
And a quotation from California's
Justice Traynor was not in the context of dicta, as the opinion in the instant case
intimates at 906. See Traynor, Some Open, Questions m the Work of State Appellate
Courts, 24 U. CHL L. Rrv. 211, 224 (1957).
27 53 Cal. 2d 195, 208-09, 347 P.2d 12, 22, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12, 22 (1959).
28

104 Cal. App. 60, 285 Pac. 321 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930).

29

17 Cal. App. 2d 594, 62 P.2d 441 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936)

30

Instant case at 906-07.

31

CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc. § 340.

32 Under CAL. PEN. COnz

to join.

Instant case at 907.

§ 2600, the husband probably would have been unable
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brought a wrongful death action within the statutory period and joined
the infant. 3
The inherent weaknesses of dicta, as compared with principles derived
from obligatory decisions of questions presented by adversary argument,34
justify the court's refusal to execute the Leeper dictum in this case; since
the contrary line of authority was not considered or discussed, since there
are significant factual distinctions between Leeper and the instant case,
and since the authority cited for the dictum does not support its extension
to wrongful death actions, it is unlikely that the California Supreme Court
intended to overturn the Sears-Haro rule.3 5 However, since Leeper and
Sears cited the same textual source for opposite conclusions, 6 the authority behind the line of holdings adverse to the infant's action should
have been examined more closely. This is especially true in view of the
fact that the common source apparently supports the dictum rather than
the holdings.3 7 Other considerations should have compelled such an
investigation: the Sears court offered no rationale for the rule it enunciated; the one higher court precedent relied on in Sears can readily be
distinguished; 8 and the cases that later followed Sears did so blindly. 9
The court neglected other avenues of inquiry relevant to the question
of how the California Supreme Court would now deal with the 1959 dictum.
An analogy might have been drawn 40 from the line of California cases
holding that contributory negligence of one heir does not bar the remaining heirs in an action for wrongful death.4 1 In placing great emphasis on
legislative policy,4 the court might have considered not only the policy
behind the short statute of limitations but also that behind the disability
provision tolling the statute during infancy.43 The court might have looked
3

3See CAi.. CODE Civ. Paoc.

34

§ 377.

See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821).

35

See Brief for Appellee, p. 2.
362 WooD, LimrIATIONS §237a(2), at 1079 (4th ed. 1916): "If an action not
severable is not barred as to one of the parties on account of his infancy at the
time the cause of action arose, it is not barred as to either of the other parties."
8
7 See ibid. Defendant argued, however, that the cases cited by Wood in support
of his proposition indicate that its rationale has no application to wrongful death
actions in California. Brief for Appellee, pp. 13-14.
3
8 Robertson v. Burrell, 110 Cal. 568, 42 Pac. 1086 (1895) (children could not
compel accounting of partnership settlement thirty years after father's death where
widow was presumed to have knowledge of the partnership). Furthermore, 19 Am.
& ENG. ENcYc. LAw 182-83 (2d ed. 1901), cited in Sears, does not support the holding.
3
9 See, e.g., Haro v. Southern Pac. R.R., 17 Cal. App. 2d 594, 62 P.2d 441 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1936).
4
o Cf. Wallman v. United Cas. Co., 147 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1945).
41
See Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal. 2d 622, 248 P.2d 922 (1952); Bowler v. Roos,
213 Cal. 484, 2 P.2d 817 (1931).
42 Sep- note 31 4upra and accompanying text.
43

CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc. § 352.
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to trends 44 and policies expressed in other jurisdictions 45 which could be
persuasive to the California court. A federal court, in its task of prediction, should also consider lapse of time since the decision, changed con46
ditions, and the recency of the dictum with which it is confronted.
The court's characterization of its function in the instant case as
"two-dimensional surmise" and its "candid" answer to the Supreme
Court's question on remand-"we just don't know" 4 7-- give a misleading
impression of its consideration of the California rule barring the infant
plaintiff. 48 Despite these words, it is clear that the court did not indulge
in conjecture, but carefully weighed the relevant factors that would be
persuasive to the California Supreme Court. By broadening iis investigation to include all the relevant data which would influence state court
decision, the federal diversity court can determine state law and settle the
affairs of its litigants in harmony with the policy of uniformity espoused
by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and its progeny, and in the best tradition of
the judicial process.
Compare Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cassetty, 119 F.2d 602 (6th Cir. 1941).
See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. Rav. 1179,
1230 & n.432 & 433 (1950) ; cf. Desiron v. Peloza, 308 Ill. App. 582, 32 N.E.2d 316
(1941). Compare In re Sheehan's Estate, 290 Ill. App. 551, 9 N.E.2d 63 (1937).
46 See Note, supra note 13, at 1307; cf. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.,
311 U.S. 538 (1941).
47 Instant case at 905-06.
4
s The Second Circuit admittedly would prefer that the conflict between dictum
and holding be settled "by the only court that can authoritatively determine it."
Instant case at 905. It has been suggested that decision by the highest state court
of unsettled questions of state law could be accomplished by a statutory denial of
diversity jurisdiction in such cases, see 1941 Wis. L. Rav. 528, 532, n.18, by judicial
extension of the "federal abstention" doctrine, see, e.g., 10 Am. U.L. Rav. 88 (1961),
or by certification of questions to the supreme court of the state whose law is in
question, see, e.g., Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IOWA L. Rav. 629 (1951).
The first two suggestions are, in essence, the same. Both would avoid rather than
solve the problem. Limitation of jurisdiction by either means to cases in which state
law is clear would eliminate much important diversity litigation. The imposition of
extra expense and delay on the parties by requiring them to reroute their actions into
the state courts can only be justified when abstention prevents unnecessary conflicts
in the federal system. In the past, this extraordinary procedure has been reserved
for situations in which considerations of comity demanded that state courts be given
the first opportunity to interpret state legislation or in which clarification of state
law by the state's highest court would render decision of a federal constitutional
question unnecessary. See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S.
185 (1959) ; Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) ; cf. Thompson v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940). See generally 1 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTIcE
0.203 (2d ed. 1960) ; Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108
U. PA. L. REv. 226 (1959); 10 Am. U.L. REv. 88 (1961); 9 SYRAcusE L. REv. 119
(1957). When a suit is brought in a federal forum solely because the parties are
citizens of different states, these considerations are not ordinarily present. The purpose of diversity jurisdiction does not require distinct, authoritative declarations of
state law, but only an impartial tribunal for its application. See Erie R.P- v. Tompdns 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938); Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1883).
Cerfication of questions to the highest state court is a more moderate suggestion
which has received much support, See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 8206 Before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1925); Kurland, Mr. Justice
Frankftrter, The Supreme Court and the Erie v. Tompkins Doctrine it Diversity
Cases, 67 YALa L.J. 187, 214 (1957) ; Vestal, supra; 40 CORNELL L.Q. 561, 580 (1955) ;
9 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 458, 465 (1941). The Florida legislature has authorized the
state supreme court to answer questions certified to it by federal appellate courts.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961) and FLA. Ap'. P, 4.61, Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v.
Clay, 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
44
45
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-LAK op MuTUALITY PRECLUDES
DEFENDANT FROM PLEADING REs JuDICATA To BAR His CoNvICTION Or A CRIME FOR WmI
ANOTHER HAS AxEADY BmEE
CONVICTED
Barnett was convicted of the voluntary manslaughter of the same
victim for whose killing Fields had already been convicted in a previous
trial. In each trial, the prosecution implicitly relied on the theory that
the defendant in that trial was solely responsible for the killing, never
raising the possibility of joint participation; and in Fields' trial, the jury
evidently rejected Fields' testimony that Barnett was the killer.

Barnett

defended on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata precludes convicting two persons who did not act in concert of committing the same
crime. But the Kentucky Court of Appeals, affirming Barnett's conviction,
held that the defense of res judicata was not available to Barnett because of
lack of mutuality, since he was neither a party to the prosecution of
Fields nor in privity with a party. Barnett v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.2d
843 (Ky. 1961).
The doctrine of res judicata requires that after adjudication on the
merits and final judgment a cause of action not be relitigated by the same
parties.' Under the complementary doctrine of collateral estoppel, a party
in a former suit or one in privity with a party is precluded from relitigating
in a subsequent action an issue of fact that was actually litigated and
determined by a former final judgment. 2 Mutuality of estoppel dictates
that one cannot rely on a previous judgment unless it could be used
against him if the opposite result had been reached. 3 In criminal law,
res judicata has its counterpart in the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy, 4 and collateral estoppel enables a defendant to use a
prior acquittal to preclude reconsideration of an issue in a second prosecution that was actually litigated and necessarily determined in his favor by
the former final judgment. 5 The mutuality doctrine has seldom been
applied in criminal cases; 6 refusals to allow the conviction of one deI A cause of action is considered as being "merged" in a judgment obtained by a
successful plaintiff and as being "barred" by a judgment against a losing plaintiff.
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 47, 48 (1942). See generally Developments in the Law
-Res Judicata,65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 824-31 (1952).
2 RESrATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68(1) (1942).

3 Iselin v. C. W. Hunter Co., 173 F.2d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Montgomery v.
Taylor-Green Gas Co., 306 Ky. 256, 258, 206 S.W.2d 919, 921 (1947).
4 Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L. REv. 317
& n.3 (1954).
5 See, e.g., Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 578-80 (1948) ; United States
v. Simon, 225 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1955); United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466,
468-69 (3d Cir. 1943); Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 120-21, 17 S.E.2d 573, 580-81
(1941).
6 Most commonly, a defendant seeks to bar relitigation of an issue necessarily
determined by his acquittal of a related offense. Since both parties are the same,
there is no problem of lack of mutuality. Where tWo defendants are separately
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fendant to preclude conviction of a second defendant have usually been
based not upon lack of mutuality but upon the assumption that the second
7
jury found joint participation.
The present case is unique in that no issue of joint participation was
raised and testimony that the second defendant had committed the crime
was presented to the jury that convicted the first defendant. The sole
testimony offered in defense of Fields, the original defendant, was that
Barnett, the second defendant, had committed the crime. 8 By finding
Fields guilty, the jury necessarily determined that Fields was lying when
she testified that Barnett had committed the crime. And if the jury
disbelieved Fields' testimony, in the absence of an issue of joint participation,9 it necessarily believed that Barnett was innocent.10 Despite the
implications which necessarily inhere in the facts preceding Barnett's
conviction, the court in the present case rested its affirmance of Barnett's
conviction upon a mechanical application of the doctrine of mutuality of
estoppel. The reasons for that doctrine-that a party should not be forced
prosecuted for participating in the same criminal activity, courts generally refuse to
allow the second defendant to make use of an acquittal of the first, not because
mutuality is lacking, but because the issue of intent must be separately decided in
each case. See, e.g., Rhodes v. State, 208 Ark. 1043, 189 S.W.2d 379 (1945) ; State
v. Bradley, 361 Mo. 267, 234 S.W.2d 556 (1950); Bacon v. State, 147 Tex. Crim.
605, 183 S.W.2d 177 (1944).
7 See, e.g., Pool v. State, 19 Ala. App. 406, 98 So. 309 (1923) ; Dumas v. State,
62 Ga. 581 (1878); State v. Dunn, 116 Iowa 219, 89 N.W. 984 (1902). But see
Huggins v. State, 25 Ga. App. 38, 103 S.E. 32 (1920) (senzble). In the instant
case, a verdict of guilty could have been based upon a finding of joint participation
only if Barnett had been indicted for aiding and abetting or had been jointly indicted
with Fields. See, e.g., Stacy v. Commonwealth, 301 Ky. 379, 192 S.W.2d 94 (1946);
Cupp v. Commonwealth, 296 Ky. 464. 177 S.W.2d 581 (1944).
8 Brief for Appellant, p. 3.
9 It is unlikely that the first jury, presented with Fields' testimony that Barnett
was solely responsible and with Barnett's testimony that he was in a town six miles
away, considered the possibility of joint action.
l 0 Barnett apparently did not contend that his innocence had been actually litigated
and necessarily determined in the prior trial. Perhaps this was a recognition that
courts generally hold that disbelief of testimony is not the equivalent of proof of
facts contrary to that testimony. See, e.g., Maniscalco v. Director, 327 Mass. 211,
216, 97 N.E.2d 639, 642 (1951) ; Hudiburgh v. Palvic, 274 S.W.2d 94, 99 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954). Nevertheless, a finding which necessarily implies that a witness gave
testimony he knew to be false ought to imply a finding that the opposite of that
testimony is true. Cf. Pariso v. Towse, 45 F.2d 962, 964 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.)
(dictum). The rationale for rejecting negative inferences-that a plaintiff in a civil
case should be required to adduce affirmative proof-is not apposite in a criminal case.
The effect of Fields' conviction to show Barnett's innocence is somewhat diminished by the fact that, even earlier, a jury had acquitted Fields of another homicide
which was apparently committed by the same person at the same time as the one for
which Fields and Barnett were later convicted. Brief for Appellee, p. 4. However,
the general verdict of acquittal may have been based upon grounds other than belief
of Fields' testimony that Barnett was the killer. A general verdict of acquittal,
unlike a conviction, is frequently considered as determining nothing more than that
the jury was not convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Hoag v.
New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 472 (1958) ; United States v. Kenney, 236 F.2d 128, 130-31
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 894 (1956); State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 422-24,
120 P2d 285, 312-13 (1941). But see Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948) ;
Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E.2d 573 (1941). See generally Comment, 28
U. Cm. L. Rnv. 142, 144-47 (1960).
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to risk losing rights against an adversary he has not chosen 11 or to consider
constantly how the conduct of present litigation may affect future, tenuously related cases 12 -do not appear to be applicable to the present case.
The prosecution in Fields' trial could concentrate upon obtaining a conviction without considering whether the determination of a collateral issue
could later be used against it, for Barnett sought to use the former judgment as determining not a collateral issue, but guilt itself.'1 The state
cannot argue that it did not expend its maximum effort in litigating that
issue. Nor can it argue that it could not have been expected to foresee
Barnett's attempt to use Fields' conviction to bar his own.14 The prosecution was quite aware at the first trial that guilt was mutually exclusive:
it called Barnett to testify.15 Also inapplicable is the unsupported assertion,
often made in civil cases, that "fairness" requires an aspect of reciprocity
-that one should not be able to take advantage of a previous judgment
unless it could have been used against him if the opposite decision had been
rendered. 16 This purported justification for requiring mutuality is inapposite in criminal cases because it proves too much: it requires that if a
prosecutor cannot use collateral estoppel against an accused, a defendant
should never be able to use a prior judgment, even if he had been the party
convicted. 17 But the latter proposition is not the law. The limits of the
mutuality policy are evidenced by an exception which allows a defendant
in a civil action, who was not a party and is not considered as being in
privity with one, to use a judgment defensively against a plaintiff to
whom defendant's liability could only be based upon the culpable act of
11 See Seavey, Res Judicata With Reference to Persons Neither Parties nor
Privies-Two California Cases, 57 HAv. L. REV. 98, 105 (1943). A civil defendant
who is sued on a small claim in a forum in which it is inconvenient to present witnesses
may intentionally offer only a weak defense. The reasons for refusing to allow one
not a party or privy to use such a judgment against a former defendant are not so
dearly applicable to a former plaintiff who chose the most convenient available forum
and presumably would not have filed suit if he did not intend to win. Nor is the
desire not to bind one by a weakly contested judgment applicable to a prosecutor
who, like a plaintiff, would appear to have no reason to refrain from putting his best
foot forward.
12 The need to consider future actions by persons other than parties and their
privies might cause undue complexity in trial tactics.

Is See note 10 supra.
14

If, on the basis of the first trial, the state had decided that Barnett and Fields

were jointly culpable, it could have prosecuted Barnett for joint participation.

If,

subsequent to the first trial but before the second, it became apparent that there had

been a miscarriage of justice and Fields had been pardoned, indictment of Barnett
as being solely responsible would have been proper. See State v. Couch, 341 Mo.
1239, 111 S.W2d 147 (1937).
15 Brief for Appellee, p. 15.
16 See cases cited note 3 stpra. See generally Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. REav. 1158, 1165
(1961).
17 An accused has a right to trial upon every issue essential to his conviction.
United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466, 468 (3d Cir. 1943); United States v.
Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1940). The cases cited say that there can
be no requirement of mutuality in criminal cases. They apparently failed to realize
that the statement that collateral estoppel cannot be used by one against whom it
could not be used is an attempt to justify the mutuality doctrine rather than a statement of the rule.
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one exonerated in a prior suit by the plaintiff.' 8 This limit clearly should
be applicable in the present case. 19 Where criminal responsibility is
mutually exclusive, a defendant's relationship to a prior action that resulted
in the conviction of another is at least as close as the relationship of a
civil defendant to a prior suit exonerating the one from whom his liability
would derive.
Whatever doctrinal faults the present case may display, the principal
objection must be to its result: two persons have been convicted of committing the same crime in the absence of any evidence or charge as to
joint participation. Two juries have been allowed to reach a result that
neither could have reached by any rational process.20 To allow such
inconsistency not only is patently unfair to one of the defendants, but may
endanger public confidence in a system that permits conviction of two
defendants where only one can rationally be found guilty.21 The assertion that, in the absence of concerted action, two defendants should not be
convicted of the same crime need not be based upon an assumption that
because the first defendant was convicted he must be guilty. Recognition
of the fallibility of juries, while rebutting such an assumption, furnishes
18 See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 96(1) (a), 99 (1942); Developments in; the
Law--Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 862-63 (1952). Thus, one in the relation
to a former party of principal-agent, master-servant, or indemnitor-indemnitee generally can use a prior judgment as a defense. See, e.g., Portland Gold Mining Co. v.
Stratton's Independence, Ltd., 158 Fed. 63 (8th Cir. 1907); Good Health Dairy
Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 17-18, 9 N.E.2d 758, 759 (1937). The injustice
of denying use of collateral estoppel to one who subsequently would have been precluded from bringing an action for indemnity against the party exonerated is not
sufficient explanation for the relaxation. It has also occurred where no relationship
of indemnitor-indemnitee exists. See, e.g., Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 36 Del.
124, 172 Atl. 260 (Super. Ct. 1934); Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134
N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
19 There appear to be no valid countervailing considerations. The reasoning of
the court that a killer should not be able to boast of his crime with impunity because
of the prior conviction of an innocent person, instant case at 836, is unconvincing.
A similar danger, which arises whenever a defendant who actually committed a crime
is acquitted, was not sufficient to prevent adoption of guarantees against double
jeopardy. Although repeated harassment of a defendant is not present in the instant
case, no defendant should be jeopardized unnecessarily. The court suggested that
executive clemency towards the innocent is an apt remedy for the problem of imprisoning two people for the same crime. However, it is doubtful whether the judicial
system should avoid dealing with a problem by leaving its solution to an executive
who has no factfinding processes and no settled criteria for decision. Although the
court did not emphasize the point, there is a hint in its opinion that Fields originally
confessed guilt in order to protect Barnett. Instant case at 837-38. Though the court
might be moved to discourage such attempts, a direct determination of whether an
innocent person is trying to secure immunity for another seems preferable to convicting both in order to render the attempt ineffective.
20
Where it favors the defendant, jury inconsistency has been accepted to enable
a jury to express a community's belief that justice requires leniency in a particular
case. See Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rsv. 1158, 1181 (1961). The limits of this exception
to the requirement of consistency are shown by the rule that a judge, who can exercise
leniency in sentencing, may not render inconsistent verdicts upon different counts.
See United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1960).
21
Moreover, there is danger of careless preindictment work and a resultant risk
of jeopardizing innocent men if prosecutors know that indictment of subsequent
defendants for committing the same crime will be possible. Cf. Lugar, supra note 4,
at 345.
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another reason to be wary of jeopardizing a second defendant. One conviction, in the absence of an issue of joint participation, should be sufficient to achieve the deterrence that is a primary objective of the criminal
law. If a court accepted this reasoning, it would have no alternative to
reversing the second conviction and rendering judgment for the defendant
22
whose case arises in the procedural posture of the instant case.
INTEREST-PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ALLOWED UNDER DEATH
oN THE mGHa SEAS AcT

In 1954 the steamship Mornuckite capsized at sea. Most officers and
members of the crew escaped into the water, where some died of exposure and others were rescued. The employer-shipowner petitioned in
admiralty for exoneration from or limitation of liability arising out of the
accident. In that proceeding, the widows and children of several of the
decedents filed damage claims under the Death on the High Seas ' and
Jones Acts 2 for personal injuries and wrongful death. The district court
held the shipowner liable to these claimants, 3 and this decision was affirmed
by the Second Circuit on appeal.4 On remand, the district court awarded
generous damages, but denied the death claimants' prayer for interest from
the dates of death until the date of judgment on the sums awarded under
the Death on the High Seas Act.5 On the issue of prejudgment interest,
the court of appeals reversed and remanded for determination of the
amount of interest. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295
F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962).
The availability of prejudgment interest 6 has been little litigated 7
22

Where two defendants are suspected, a balance between the rights of defendant

and prosecution may be most equitably achieved by jointly indicting both defendants,
requiring a finding upon joint participation in a special verdict, and refusing to accept
a verdict of guilty against both unless joint participation is found.

141 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1958) (wrongful death).
241 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958) (incorporating Federal Employers' Liability Act § 9, 36 Stat. 291 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1958)) (survival).
3 Petition of Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).

4 Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Armco Steel Corp., 272 F.2d 873 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 990 (1960).
- Petition of Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).

6 The term "prejudgment interest" here refers to interest computed on and added to
the amount awarded to a successful claimant and allowed by the court as compensation for the use or detention of that sum, whether liquidated before judgment or
not, by the judgment debtor, or for the claimant's loss of the use of the money during

the period between accrual of the cause of action and entry of judgment.
McCoRmICK, DAMAGES § 50 (1935).

See

Most definitions of prejudgment interest are

limited to ascertained amounts, see Kishi v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 10 F2d 356
(5th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 268 U.S. 708 (1925)

(applying general statu-

tory definition of interest), or specifically exclude interest on unliquidated damages,

see Ansco Constr. Co. v. Ocean View Estates, Inc., 169 Cal. App. 2d 235, 337 P.2d
146 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (applying California Civil Code).

7 See 30 CoNr.

B.J. 407, 410 n.23 (1956).

Even when interest is claimed, plaintiffs

are apparently reluctant, upon the denial of the claim by the trial court, to pursue
further costly litigation for a comparatively small sum.
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and remains an unsettled area of the law.8 The uncertainty stems largely
from the manner in which such interest has been treated-as merely part
of the general damages left to be ascertained by the trier of fact, rather
than as a separate item. There is, however, a trend toward liberality in
the allowance of such interest. For any given cause of action, this usually
begins with the court's permitting the jury to impose interest in its discretion and evolves into the allowance of such interest as a matter of law.10
Virtually every American jurisdiction today allows prejudgment interest
8 See generally McComIcK, DAMAGES §§ 50-57 (1935).
9 The difference between characterizing prejudgment interest as "interes' and as
"damages" has been called merely theoretical. The Manhattan, 85 F.2d 427, 429 (3d
Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1937). Nevertheless, the distinction may be
important, for example, in devising the procedure to be used to assess such interest
and in determining the amount of the plaintiff's claim under statutes limiting the
jurisdiction to certain courts. See Brown v. Webster, 156 U.S. 328 (1895) ; Barnes
v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 279 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); McElroy
v. Industrial Petroleum Co., 260 S.W. 693 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (interest as damages
included in ascertaining jurisdictional amount). But see Reynolds v. Reynolds, 65
F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ark. 1946) (interest on judgment excluded from jurisdictional
amount).
10
McCoRmicx, DAMAGES § 51, at 210 (1935); see Lewis v. W. D. Rountree &
Co., 79 N.C. 122, 126 (1878) (dictum). Cases in which the allowance of interest is
in the jury's discretion tend to produce uncertainty, for the jury usually is instructed
only that it may, if it so desires, award interest. See King v. Southern Pac. Co.,
109 Cal. 96, 99, 41 Pac. 786, 787 (1895) (jury charge that interest must be imposed
held error under California Civil Code); Central R.R. v. Sears, 66 Ga. 499 (1880) ;
Wilson v. City of Troy, 135 N.Y. 96, 102, 32 N.E. 44, 45 (1892) (instruction that
interest may be awarded upheld); Eddy v. Lafayette, 163 U.S. 456, 467 (1896)
(dictum). Although the jury is frequently required to state the amount of interest,
if any, included in its verdict, the procedure used does not encourage consistency
among the awards of different juries. Nonjury cases show a stronger pull toward
uniformity and the development of precedents, since the discretion of the trial judge
as trier of fact is, to a large extent, subject to appellate review. See The President
Madison, 91 F.2d 835, 845 (9th Cir. 1937). When prejudgment interest is given as a
matter of right, rules of law develop as to the circumstances under which it is allowable,
but the actual process of calculating the interest often remains an enigma. See Blunt
v. Montpelier & W.R.RR., 89 Vt. 152, 157, 94 Atl. 106, 108 (1915). Most courts
require that the computation be left to the jury, see Frasier v. Public Serv. Interstate
Transp. Co., 254 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1958), but some permit the trial judge to add
interest to the amount awarded by the jury, see Ewing v. Win. L. Foley, Inc., 115
Tex. 222, 234, 280 S.W. 499, 503 (1926). Regardless of who determines the amount
of interest, two questions must be decided: first, the rate of interest; and, second, the
method of applying the rate of interest to the amount of damages in order to determine the amount of interest. The legal rate of interest is almost invariably used
when the amount of the principal claim is liquidated or based upon a valuation of
property or services. See Holden v. Trust Co., 100 U.S. 72 (1879) ; Haas v. McGinn,
64 R.I. 133, 143, 11 A.2d 284, 286 (1940). However, when the sum claimed is unliquidated or not readily ascertainable, the trier of fact may be permitted to set the
interest rate in a given case on the basis of such factors as the investment ability of
the plaintiff-the method employed in discounting damages to their present worth.
See Southern Pac. Co. v. Klinge, 65 F.2d 85 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S.
657 (1933) ; Von Tersch v. Ahrendsen, 251 Iowa 115, 122, 99 N.W.2d 287, 291 (1959).
Although the few cases allowing prejudgment interest on unliquidated damages reveal
no information on the rate used, the jury is generally given wide discretion to determine the amount of interest in such cases. In federal admiralty cases in particular
there is a tendency to eschew the legal rate in favor of the rate imposed in courts
of the state in which the federal court is sitting, see Geotechnical Corp. v. Pure Oil
Co., 214 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1954), or a rate which suits the facts of the individual
case, see instant case at 595; Holliday v. Pacific Atl. S.S. Co., 117 F. Supp. 729,
735 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 212 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1954) (discount to present
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on a claim for a fixed amount." But most courts disallow interest on an
unliquidated claim in the absence of a specific statute. 2 Admiralty has
been more willing to award prejudgment interest than the civil courts,13
partly because of admiralty's ancient hospitality to interest'14 and partly
because of the absence of the jury. 15 Such interest is granted as a matter
of right for property damage,' 6 but generally not in other actions for
unliquidated damages, such as personal injury or wrongful death suits. 1'
Under both common law and the law of admiralty, an injured person's
death extinguished both his own cause of action and that of his dependents
based on the injury, and no cause of action for the death of an injured
person was recognized. 18 "Survival" and "wrongful death" statutes were
designed to remedy this anomaly. 19 The Jones Act 2 0 extended to seamen
the wrongful death and survival provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.2 ' Prejudgment interest has been consistently denied under
the Jones Act 2 on the grounds that the damages are unliquidated and
"1 See, e.g., Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 256 (1924); United States v.
Skinner & Eddy Corp., 28 F.2d 373, 385 (W.D. Wash. 1928), modified, 35 F.2d 889
(9th Cir. 1929), petitiom for cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 770 (1930); GA. CODE ANI.
§57-110 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §6 (1935).
12 See, e.g., Burrows v. Lownsdale, 133 Fed. 250 (9th Cir. 1904) ; Saliba v. Saliba,
178 Ark. 250, 256, 11 S.W.2d 774, 776 (1928). Contra, Barrett Co. v. Panther Rubber
Mfg. Co., 24 F.2d 329, 337 (1st Cir. 1928).
13 Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Amirault, 202 F.2d 893, 898 (1st Cir. 1953)
(dictum).
-4

See

SANBORN, ORIGINS OF THE EARLY ENGLISH MARITImE AND COMMERCIAL

LAW 102, 145, 200-01 (1930). Medieval maritime law borrowed its tolerance of interest in general and prejudgment interest in particular from the civil law of Rome.
See 4 BENEDICT, AMERICAN ADMIRALTYe §671 (6th ed. 1940). United States admiralty law is adapted directly from this general maritime law rather than from
English admiralty, whose courts are more conservative in the allowance of interest
as damages. See id. §§ 726-30.
15 See 2 id. § 224.
16 See, e.g., The Umbria, 166 U.S. 404, 421 (1897) ; The President Madison, 91
F.2d 835, 845 (9th Cir. 1937); O'Brien Bros. v. The Helen B. Moran, 160 F.2d
502 (2d Cir. 1947) (dictum). But see The Manhattan, 85 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1936),
cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1937). The Third Circuit appears to hold that prejudgment
interest may be granted, in the discretion of the trial court, only if warranted by the
facts of the case, while other courts have adopted the view that a property damage
claimant is entitled to such interest unless the court, in its discretion, believes that the
particular circumstances demand the denial of interest.
17 See The Argo, 210 Fed. 872 (9th Cir. 1914).
18 Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 650 (1953) (dictum) (admiralty) ; Frasier
v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 254 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1958) (dictum)
(common law); Lamm v. Lorbacher, 235 N.C. 728, 730, 71 S.E.2d 49, 51 (1952)
(dictum) (common law).
'9 Survival statutes permit the personal representative of the deceased to maintain
an action for damages that the deceased could have brought had he lived, while
wrongful death acts provide a new cause of action for the pecuniary loss sustained
by the decedent's statutory beneficiaries as a result of his death. See generally St.
Louis, I.M. & So. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915).
2041 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1958).
21 § 1, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958) (wrongful death); § 9, added
by 36 Stat. 291 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1958) (survival).
22 See, e.g., Sabine Towing Co. v. Brennan, 85 F.2d 478, 484 (5th Cir. 1936),
rev'd on other grounds, 300 U.S. 342 (1937); Cleveland Tankers, Inc. v. Tierney,
169 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1948) (dictum).
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that the provision of the Judicial Code for interest after judgment in
civil cases 2 indicates a congressional intent to preclude interest before
judgment. 24 The Death on the High Seas Act,2 5 passed three months
before the Jones Act, also creates a wrongful death action. The question
of prejudgment interest under the High Seas Act had been a subject of
controversy among the three courts which considered it before the instant
case.

A New York supreme court2 6 and a federal district court sitting

in New York 2 7 both denied such interest because the act contains no
specific provision for it, but the Fifth Circuit, relying on the act's compensation section and the doctrine of restitutio in integrum, reached the
opposite conclusion. 8 The decision in the instant case establishes a clear
weight of authority resolved this conflict in favor of allowing prejudgment
interest.
There was no precedent binding the court in the present case, although
the district court, which denied prejudgment interest," cited as authority
an earlier Second Circuit case decided under the Jones Act.30 The court
of appeals sought to distinguish actions brought under the Jones Act by
relying in part on a provision peculiar to section 2 of the Death on the
High Seas Act that the recovery shall be "fair and just compensation for
23 28

U.S.C. § 1961 (1958) : "Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment

in a civil case recovered in a district court.
from the date of the entry of the judgment

. .
...

.

Such interest shall be calculated
"

24See Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R., 164 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1947), aff'd on other
grmnds, 334 U.S. 304 (1948) ; Louisiana & Ark. Ry. v. Pratt, 142 F2d 847 (5th Cir.
1944) (both FELA cases). But see Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Amirault, 202
F2d 893, 895 (1st Cir. 1953) (dictum).
2541 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§761-67 (1958).
26
Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup.
Ct. 1943), aff'd mer., 267 App. Div. 947, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1944), aff'd men., 293
N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945).
27 First Nat'l Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 528, 538 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), aff'd o; other grounds, 288 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1961).
28
National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
885 29
(1959).
Petition of Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
30 Casey v. American Export Lines, Inc., 173 F.2d 324 (2d Cir.), revzd o; other
grouds, 176 F.2d 337, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 885 (1949). That case was based,
ultimately, on Railroad v. Wallace, 91 Tenn. 35, 17 S.W. 882 (1891), to which it
can be traced by a remarkable sequence of cases, each of which merely cites, without
elaboration, the preceding one as direct authority. See Cortes v. Baltimore Insular
Line, Inc., 66 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1933) (FELA); Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. v.
Busby, 41 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1930) (FELA); The Argo, 210 Fed. 872 (9th Cir.
1914)1904)
(pre-FELA
personal injury suit); Burrows v. Lownsdale, 133 Fed. 250 (9th
(pre-FELA. personal injury suit). The Wallace case involved a personal
Cir.

injury action.

The court denied prejudgment interest because the verdict included

damages for pain and suffering in an unspecified amount-damages not susceptible
of definite computation-and because the jury, in measuring the damages, took into
account the pain and suffering and disability between the date of the accident and the
present
as thepersonas
such
a case,
inapplicable
is clearly
Such reasoning
of judgment.
date
injured
to the
losstodue
is a pecuniary
of damages
which the measure
one, in

death, see Death on the High Seas Act §2, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1958),
no interest is demanded on the amount awarded for pain and suffering, instant case at
the
are complete
the damages
of damages,
the measure
the court
592
of the atdelay
to take account
the damages
increase
the court cannot
anddetermines
of death,
timen.5,
184
Inc.,
Lines,
Moore-McCormack
of
Petition
see
between death and judgment,
F. Supp. 585 (S.D.Nq.Y. 1960}).
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Reliance upon this language,

however, does not call forth an adequate distinction, for the FELA (which
the Jones Act incorporates) has been interpreted to grant a similar measure
of damages despite the absence of such a provision,32 and under that act
prejudgment interest has been uniformly denied.33 The probable purpose
of the provision relied on was simply to make clear that the High Seas
Act is not for the benefit of the decedent's estate 3 4 and that no survival
of the cause of action for injuries incurred before death, like that provided in the FELA and Jones Acts, was intended. 35
There is, however, another difference between the High Seas Act and
the Jones Act which is helpful in analyzing the problem of prejudgment
36
interest: Jones Act cases may be brought either at law or in admiralty,
7
while all claims under the High Seas Act must be prosecuted in admiralty.3
Although the section of the Judicial Code providing for interest from the
time of judgment has often been cited in denying prejudgment interest in
Jones Act cases,38 that section does not apply on the admiralty side of a federal court.39 Furthermore, under the Jones Act at law, the items of damage
3141 Stat 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §762 (1958).
32See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Holloway, 246 U.S. 525, 527 (1918)

(FELA

case: "damages as will fairly and reasonably compensate . . . for the loss of pecuniary
benefits"); Wetherbee v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 191 F.2d 302, 308 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953) (FELA case: "justly compensate").
33 See cases cited note 22 supra. Although a number of state acts include a
damage provision very similar to that in the High Seas Act, see, e.g., AyM. STAT. A.NN.
§ 27-909 (Supp. 1961) ("fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries");
IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1959), in only one state has a plaintiff
been allowed such interest in the absence of a specific statutory provision for it, see
Danskin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 83 N.J.L. 522, 528-31, 83 Adt. 1006, 1008-09 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1912). The almost universal failure of death claimants to press claims for

prejudgment interest may indicate a widespread belief that such demands would be

futile, although it is perhaps due in part to a lack of diligence on the part of counsel.
34 Under some state statutes, the measure of damages has been held to be the
loss to the decedent's estate rather than the loss to his dependents. See Pitman v.
Merriman, 80 N.H. 295, 117 Atl. 18 (1922).
35 Section 2, in expressing a measure of damages generally used in wrongful
death actions, seems to add nothing to § 1, which would constitute a self-sufficient

provision for a wrongful death action even without the addition of §2. Section 2 is
evidently necessary to ensure that § 5 (a personal injury suit begun in admiralty by
a seaman may proceed, after his death from the same injuries, as a suit by his personal
representative under the act "for the recovery of compensation provided in section 2
[46 U.S.C. §762]," 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §765 (1958)) does not operate
to continue the decedent's personal injury action-as it would in the absence of
incorporation of standards from § 2-but merely constitutes a procedural device
whereby the personal representative can proceed in the already docketed case, even
though the plaintiffs and the cause of action are new. See Decker v. Moore-

McCormack Lines, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 560 (D. Mass. 1950); Pickles v. F. Leyland &
Co., 10 F.2d 371 (D. Mass. 1925) (dictum).
36 See Nilsson v. American Oil Co., 118 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Tex. 1954). But see
Geistlinger v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 295 Fed. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
37 Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Egan v.

Donaldson AtI. Line, Ltd., 37 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); see Death on the High
Seas Act § 1, 41 Stat 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §761 (1958). Contra, Sierra v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 107 F. Supp. 519 (D.P.R. 1952); Batkiewicz v. Seas Shipping
Co., 53 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
38 See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
39 By its terms, 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1958) applies

to a "civil case." Although
the latter term is not defined, other sections of the Judicial Code suggest that "civil
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to be awarded and the amount of each item involve questions of fact and are
therefore left to the jury, with appropriate instructions by the court; 4D the
jury is not required to reveal its computations nor to itemize the elements
of damage.41 If prejudgment interest were permitted in Jones Act cases,
the allowance and computation of such interest would be within the province
of the jury, subject to modification by the court of grossly excessive or inadequate awards.4 A jury, however, might be unable to calculate each
element of damages precisely, particularly when the elements are unliquidated, and might be confused by a requirement that it do so; as a result, it
might find difficulty in fitting the damages to the particular case if bound by
fixed rules.4 3 In any event, the refusal of prejudgment interest in jury cases
may be warranted by the probability that juries ordinarily take into account
the delay between death and judgment in determining the amount of damages. 44 The jury has effective discretion to weigh the various factors in each
case to determine to what extent, if any, it should compensate for delay. Although this power must not be exercised by mere whim, appellate courts
refuse to reduce awarded damages on the ground of excessiveness except
in extreme cases.4 5 In High Seas cases, on the other hand, the judge
must state specifically his reasons for allowance or denial of prejudgment
interest and must disclose his computations; and his decision is subject to
complete review.4 6 It could be argued that this distinction should not be
case" does not include those brought in admiralty. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1921 (1958),
which sets forth separate rules for marshals' services performed in admiralty, civil,
and criminal cases; cf. Woolfson v. Doyle, 180 F. Supp. 86, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)

(dictum).
40

See Rabe v. Shoenberger Coal Co., 213 Pa. 252, 62 Atl. 854 (1906).
41 See Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 513-15 (1915) (no requirement
that jury apportion damages among plaintiffs under FELA) ; Seaboard Air Line R.R.
v. Connor, 261 F.2d 656, 659 (4th Cir. 1958) (FELA) ; Poindexter v. Groves, 103
F. Supp. 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 197 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1952) (Jones Act).
Compare Holliday v. Pacific Atl. S.S. Co., 117 F. Supp. 729 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd,
212 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1954) (admiralty).
42
In Jones v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 55 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Pa. 194), a shipowner
contended that the jury's award for the present value of the loss of future earnings
was excessive. The court said: "I do not know what basis was used by the jury in
arriving at its verdict in this case, nor can I, under our system of jurisprudence,
discover what it was. If it can be sustained under the testimony and the law upon
any proper basis it is my duty to let it stand." Id. at 23. Cf. Sinclair Ref. Co. v.
Fuller, 190 Ark. 426, 433, 79 S.W.2d 736, 740 (1935) (libel and slander).
43 A judge is probably better equipped to perform the often complicated task
of computing the damages. In a nonjury case, he can see to it that the damages are
fitted to the findings of fact, for he performs both functions. Strict judicial control
of the ascertainment of damages in a jury trial, however, would split the fact-finding
and danage-determining functions and allow the judge to supervise the calculation
of damages in ignorance of the precise facts found by the jury and upon which such
damages are therefore based.
44 See Frazer v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 141 Mass. 126, 128, 4 N.E. 620, 621-22
(1886) (Holmes, J.) (dictum).
45 See Herring v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 137 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1943).
Some
appellate courts have held that they are without power to modify the amount of the
jury's verdict in Jones Act cases and that only trial judges have such power. See
Kennair v. Mississippi Shipping Co., 197 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Hust v. MooreMcCormack Lines, Inc., 180 Ore. 409, 177 P.2d 429 (1947).
46 The trial judge is allowed some discretion so that he may deny interest in
appropriate cases--for example, when the libellant has unreasonably delayed his
action, see The Russell No. 3, 82 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1936), or when the libellant's
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made the basis of a different result under the two acts, since a Jones Act
suit may be brought in admiralty as well as at law. But the substantive
law under the Jones Act must be uniform regardless of the forum; 47 and
thus considerations applicable only to jury trials necessarily apply to suits
brought under that act in admiralty. Although in other contexts the
comparatively minor differences between the two overlapping statutes 48 are
immaterial, 4 9 the court in the present case was justified, since the law as
to prejudgment interest under the High Seas Act was not yet crystallized,50 in distinguishing between them. In that way it was able to give
the claimants the full compensation to which it believed them entitled
without the necessity of calling into question a formidable line of cases
decided under a different act. 51
Although courts frequently reiterate that the only reason for awarding prejudgment interest is to give the plaintiff fair compensation, 52 the
idea persists that such interest is a judicial penalty for the defendant's
failure to pay promptly the sum which is necessary to make the plaintiff
whole and which became due when the cause of action arose.53 This idea
fault is greater than that of the respondent, see Afram Transp. Co. v. Bergechief, 285
F2d 119 (2d Cir. 1960); The Wright, 109 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1940). In the latter
situation, refusal to grant interest helps ameliorate the harsh American rule of division
of damages.
47
See Vassos v. Societa Trans-Oceanica Conopus, S.A., 143 F. Supp. 945
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 277 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 935 (1960). In that case, the court held that a libel in admiralty under the Jones
Act must be dismissed if a prior action at law under that act for the same injuries had
been dismissed and no new facts were introduced, since the Jones Act provides one
cause of action, even though the libellant presents a new theory of recovery in the
second suit. Cf. Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927) (Jones Act
suit in admiralty is res judicata as to subsequent negligence action at law in state
court).
48 The Death on the High Seas Act was designed to provide a remedy, exclusive
for those other than seamen, for wrongful deaths resulting from injuries suffered
outside the territorial limits of the United States and any other country, since such
deaths are not covered by the general maritime law and may be beyond the reach of
state wrongful death statutes. See Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85
(N.D. Cal. 1954). But see Elliott v. Steinfeldt, 254 App. Div. 739, 4 N.Y.S.2d 9
(1938) (under state wrongful death statute, state court has concurrent jurisdiction
with federal court over deaths on the high seas). The act applies to the wrongful
death of anyone, so long as the wrongful act occurred in international waters. See
State ex rel. Maines v. A/S Nye Kristianborg, 84 F. Supp. 775 (D. Md. 1949). The
Jones Act, on the other hand, extended the rights of railroad workers under the FELA
to seamen only, whether within the United States or not, but in no way modified the
FELA provisions to apply to the circumstances of maritime commerce. Thus,
although Congress has granted two separate causes of action to the dependents of
deceased seamen, this result was not deliberate.
49 See In re Rademaker's Estate, 166 Misc. 201, 2 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
50 See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
51
E.g., Casey v. American Export Lines, Inc., 173 F.2d 324 (2d Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 176 F.2d 337, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 885 (1949); Otis v. State, 47
N.Y.S.2d 755, 760 (Ct. Cl. 1944); Cleveland Tankers, Inc. v. Tierney, 169 F.2d 622
(6th Cir. 1948) (dictum). But cf. LLEWELLYN, THE COMmoN LAW TRArITioN:
DECIDING APPEALs 287 (1960).
52 See Newburgh Land & Dock Co. v. Texas Co., 227 F.2d 732, 734 (2d Cir.
1955) (L. Hand, J.); cf. Drowne v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 5 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.
1925).
Prevention of unjust enrichment and discouragement of wrongful withholding

of money due have been cited as rationales for imposing interest.
L.R.R. v. Boston & L.R.R., 61 Fed. 237, 251 (1st Cir. 1894).

See Nashua &
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has sometimes been seized upon as a rationale for disallowing all prejudgment interest on unliquidated damages: 54 the defendant cannot be
expected to settle his liability before judgment, for there are ordinarily no
reliable guidelines by which the parties can predict what the subsequent
award might turn out to be. Even under such a rationale, however,
damages recoverable under the High Seas Act, though usually considered
unliquidated, might nonetheless bear prejudgment interest, for there are
definite standards by which such damages can be predicted with fair
accuracy. 55 Furthermore, unlike personal injury damages, where pain
and suffering and medical expenses incurred after the wrongful act may
augment the amount of the defendant's liability, 56 damages in a wrongful
death action are frozen at the time of death. 57 In a personal injury action,
prejudgment interest might be calculated in part on amounts which constituted no loss to the plaintiff and to which he was not entitled until
some time after the accident. The addition of interest on such amounts
would clearly give the claimant more than just compensation. In death
actions, however, the defendant is liable for the full amount-the present
value of the total reasonably expected future contributions-at the time of
death. Thus there is a sound basis for realistic negotiation and settlement,
which might be fostered by the imposition of prejudgment interest.
In all events, the imposition of prejudgment interest under the High
Seas Act is warranted by its measure of damages, which is expressly
designed to restore the "pecuniary loss" to dependent relatives. 58 The
54One court said that "the rule that interest is not allowed on unliquidated
claims" has "no technical significance' but "is applied in each case according as the
detention of money is or is not wrongful under the circumstances." Capitol City

Lumber Co. v. Sudarsky, 95 Conn. 336, 340-41, 111 At. 349, 350 (1920).

65 Future contributions are determined on the basis of past contributions, the
relationship between the decedent and the claimant, the probable future earnings and
personal expenses of the decedent, and the life expectancies of decedent and claimant.
See National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
885 (1959); Petition of Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The
decedent's employer, who is often-as in the instant case-the defendant in High
Seas Act cases, is in a good position to know the decedent's expected future earnings,
should have access to actuarial tables, and probably has knowledge of the employee's
expenses and relationship to his family. Under these circumstances, the loss of future
contributions, while not so readily measurable as damage to property, is more easily
ascertainable than injury to the personality. Damages for loss of nurture are less
easily reduced to concrete sums, but nonetheless are based upon the child's pecuniary
loss, not upon injury to his feelings, such as sorrow or loss of companionship. See
First Nat1 Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Some
state courts, a minority, have awarded prejudgment interest on damages under
wrongful death acts. See Georgia TR. & Banking Co. v. Garr, 57 Ga. 277 (1876)
(semble) ; Burns v. Eminger, 84 Mont. 397, 410, 276 Pac. 437, 443 (1929).
56 See McConaici, DAMAGES §§ 88, 90 (1935).
57
In the Matter of Estate of Uravic, 142 Misc. 775, 782, 255 N.Y. Supp. 638,
646 (Surr. Ct. 1932) (Jones Act). "[T]he problem of measuring the loss in terms
of money . . . is simplified in that the uncertainty as to the extent and duration
of the injury to the victim is eliminated . . . . " McCo mIcx, DAMAGES § 105
(1935). Thus, the remarriage of the widow does not mitigate damages. See Georgia
R.R. & Banking Co. v. Garr, 57 Ga. 277 (1876). The one exception to the rule that
the amount of loss is unchanged after the death of the deceased is that the death of
the claimant limits the damages his estate may recover to his pecuniary loss up to
the time of his death. See Petition of Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
5s § 2, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1958).
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question whether all the factors which determine the amount of damages
are complete at a given time must not be confused with the question of
when the losses to the claimants occur. Under wrongful death acts, the
loss sustained by a decedent's survivors over a given period of time is
equivalent to the pecuniary contributions which the decedent would have
made to his survivors during that period. Thus, damages in death actions
are measured by losses to be sustained by the claimants over varying
future periods, and the present worth of the damages allotted for each
future period must be ascertained. 59 The total amount awarded for postjudgment damages is an amount which, if invested at a given rate of
interest, would provide the claimant in each year with an amount equivalent
to the loss sustained by him during that year and would be exhausted at
the end of the entire period over which losses are incurred.60 It is
logical, therefore, that the present value of any losses suffered by the claimants prior to judgment be determined 6 ' and that the total award for prejudgment damage consist of the amount which the claimant would have had
at the time of judgment if he had received the amounts allotted to each
year before judgment when due and had invested them. When an element
of damages, such as pain and suffering, is in one lump sum and is not
prorated over a period of time, it is meaningless to talk of present value,
and the denial of prejudgment interest may be desirable, especially when
the measure of such damages is unclear. 2 However, when the damage is
specifically allocated over certain periods, an award of the present value
of the amount allotted to the period before judgment, as well as of the
present value of the sums due at various times after judgment, will give
the claimant truly fair compensation.

LAB1OR LAW-FEDERAL LAw PnREEus STATE BOARD'S AuTHORITY To PUBLISH REPORTS FIXInG REsPOINSIBILITY Fop. LABORMANAGEMENT CONTROVERSIES

In 1960 General Electric Company and the union representing employees in its Massachusetts plants began negotiating for a new collective
bargaining agreement. When negotiations reached an impasse, the union
called a strike which lasted for six weeks until the men returned to work
under a strike-truce agreement. Twelve days after the truce was signed,
59 See The City of Rome, 48 F.2d 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); Peterson v. United
N.Y. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n, 17 F. Supp. 676, 677 (E.D.N.Y. 1936) ; McCoRMIcK,
DAMAGES §§ 56, 225 (1935).

60 See Nelson v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry., 104 Mich. 582, 587-88, 62 N.W.
993, 995 (1895) ; Reitler v. Pa. R.R., 238 Pa. 1, 85 Atl. 1000 (1913).
61 This argument was advanced in the present case. Instant case at 594. Like
damages for the loss of future pecuniary benefits from a decedent, a recovery for loss
due to impaired earning capacity is prorated over a period of time and therefore
must be reduced to its present worth. See McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285 Pa. 561, 568,
132 AUt. 810, 812 (1926). By the same reasoning, interest on the loss of past earnings
may be awarded. See Bentz v. E. N. Johnson & Co., 21 Pa. Dist. 1068 (C.P. 1912).
62
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§ 57 (1935).
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the Governor of Massachusetts, at the union's request, asked the State
Board of Conciliation and Arbitration to hold hearings in an attempt to
lead the parties to a resolution of their differences. The statute authorizing
such hearings provides that if no settlement is reached and the parties
refuse to arbitrate the Board may publish a report fixing responsibility
for the deadlock.' GE immediately petitioned a federal district court to
enjoin enforcement of the state statute,2 but the court dismissed the complaint for lack of equity jurisdiction. After unsuccessfully petitioning the
Board to quash summonses served on its representatives, GE appealed the
district court's order. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed,
finding adequate grounds for equity jurisdiction 3 and holding the Massachusetts law invalid. By exerting excessive pressure on the parties to
reach an agreement, the court said, the state law conflicted with the policy
of federal legislation to encourage free and voluntary settlement of labor
disputes in industries affecting commerce. General Elec. Co. v. Callahan,
294 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1961).
Certain types of conduct, referred to by section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act as "concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining," 4 are defined and protected by that act and court decisions
under it,5 and the states are forbidden by the supremacy clause to interfere
with them. 6 Other concretely defined types of conduct are specifically
prohibited by section 8 of the act,7 and a special federal tribunal-the
MASS. AxN. LAws ch. 150, §§ 3, 5 (1957).
Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.
3The court held that GE had no adequate remedy at law and was not obliged
to exhaust its state administrative remedies, since, "the basic question for decision
being one . . . of the interpretation of federal statutes and decisions, it is one that
the State Board was not established and is not qualified to decide and can hardly
be expected to entertain." Instant case at 64. See generally Schwarzer, Enforcing
Federal Supremuacy: Relief Against Federal-State Regulatory Conflicts, 43 CALIF.
L. REv. 234 (1955). The court also held that the complaint did not require convening
a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958), which calls for such a court to
hear actions to enjoin enforcement of state statutes on the ground of "unconstitutionality." Relying on Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940), the court declared that
a suit attacking state legislation under the supremacy clause of the Constitution is
not an attack on the "constitutionality" of the legislation.
4 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
5Thus the right to strike is specifically protected by National Labor Relations
Act § 13, 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1958), although its scope is not
unlimited, see National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (4) (secondary activities), § 8(d)
(sixty-day "cooling off" period before modification of existing agreement), 61 Stat.
141, 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§158(b)(4), (d) (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (4) (Supp. II, 1961).
6 "The substantial issue is whether Congress has protected the union conduct
which the State has forbidden, and hence the state legislation must yield." UAWA v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 252 (1949); accord, UMW
v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956); UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S.
454 (1950). More recently, the Court has declared that it will no longer undertake
"for itself to determine the status of the disputed activity . . .": "When an activity
is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts
must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if
the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 & n.4 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
761 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C: § 158 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§158 (Supp. II, 1961).
I
2
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NLRB--exists for their suppression.8 Here too, the doctrine of preemption forbids the states from supplementing this forum or its remedies. 9
The NLRA also expresses an intention to encourage a less clearly defined
aggregate conduct, subsumed under the general phrase "collective bar-

gaining." 10 Although the phrase "free collective bargaining" does not
appear in the text of the NLRA, itis found in the legislative history,"
and courts have taken itup as a basic assumption of the act. 12 The term
"free" is broad, and its precise meaning in this area is still unsettled. The
courts have had few occasions to consider whether state statutes and practices which affect free collective bargaining interfere with the intended
freedom to the extent that they "conflict" and are barred by federal preemption of the field. In one case, 13 passing upon the validity of a Wisconsin statute which interfered with the federally protected right to strike,' 4
the Supreme Court took occasion to comment on portions of the state law
which required compulsory arbitration of labor disputes in public utilities.1
The Court stated in dictum that such a method of resolving labor disputes
not only impaired freedom of negotiation, but was in many respects contradictory to the very concept of collective bargaining.'"
This incompatibility is also clearly recognized in the legislative history of the TaftHartley Act. 17 The dictum, therefore, throws little light on the broader
issue of how free from state interference bargaining is to remain in the area
8National Labor Relations Act § 3(a) (establishing the Board), § 10 (powers
and procedure of the Board), 61 Stat 139, 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 153(a), 160 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. II, 1961).
9
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); see Comment, Pre-Emption in Labor Relations, 35
TEXAs L. Ry. 555 (1957).

An exception to the preemption doctrine permits a state

to enjoin union activity which seriously threatens to cause violence. UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1959) (dictum). Compare United Constr.
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (union conduct violating
§ 8(b) (1) (A) held actionable in a state court as a common-law tort in a suit for
damages).
10 Encouraging collective bargaining is declared to be federal policy in National
Labor Relations Act § 1, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958). Failure to
bargain collectively, as defined in §8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1958), is an unfair labor practice, 99 8(a) (5), (b) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a) (5), (b)(3) (1958).
11 See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 13 (1947); 93 Co'G. REc. 3835
(1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
12 See NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952).
'3 Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
14 Wis. STAT. AzN. § 111.62 (1957).
15 Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.55-.64 (1957).
16 340 U.S. at 394-95, 397.
17 "It is difficult to see how such a system [as compulsory arbitration] could be

operated indefinitely without compelling the Government to make decisions on economic
issues which in normal times should be solved by the free play of economic forces."
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1947). "We did not feel that we should
put into law, as a part of the collective-bargaining machinery, an ultimate resort to
compulsory arbitration .

.

.

. If such a remedy is available as a routine . . . there

will always be pressure to resort to it . . . and [one party] will back out of collective bargaining." 93 CONG. REc. 3835 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
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short of compulsory arbitration. One possible approach is suggested by
Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver.18 There the Supreme Court struck
down an injunction, issued under the Ohio antitrust law, 19 barring enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement fixing truck rental prices for
m2
Characterizing the contract in question as a wage agreelessor-drivers.
ment, the Court stressed that federal legislation requires the parties to
bargain collectively as to wages. 2 ' In discussing the federally protected
scope of freedom to bargain over wages, the Court held that state law
must not "frustrate" and thereby constrict the federally created freedom.m2
"Since the federal law operates here . . . to leave the parties free, the
inconsistent application of State law is necessarily outside the power of the
state." 23

Like the Supreme Court in Oliver, the court in the instant case was
essentially clarifying the term "free" as it has come to be applied to collective bargaining under the NLRA. In doing so, it echoed the language and
approach of Oliver, though citing it only in another context.24 The court
reasoned that after publication of the State Board's report the authority
of the state would become an important element in the bargaining power
of the party declared blameless, and public opinion would probably be
brought to bear against the other party. 2 5 The legislative history of the
Taft-Hartley Act does not clearly support the preemption of such indirect
m 2
The 1947 legislation was enacted against the background of
pressure.
wartime experience with compulsory arbitration and plant seizure,2 7 and
18 358 U.S. 283

(1959).

19 Oaio REv. CoDn AxN. §§ 1331.01-.99 (Page 1953).
20 358 U.S. at 296, 298-304.
21
1d. at 293-95.
22 "The application [of Ohio law] would frustrate the parties' solution of a
problem which Congress has required them to negotiate in good faith toward solving,
and in the solution of which it imposed no limitations relevant here." Id. at 296.
23 Ibid.

24 This was to document a statement of the general policy of federal labor legislation. Instant case at 67.
25 Instant case at 67.
2
6 When the Wagner Act was enacted, the issue of "collective bargaining" was

whether labor should have a federally protected right to face its employers united

or fragmented. See Hearings on Bills to Amend the National Labor Relations Act
Before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at 5-7, 29, 47, 100 (1939). After World War II and because of wartime experience,
see note 27 infra, the issue became in part the extent to which government should
interfere in dealings between organized labor and management. For purposes of
determining the nature of the freedom with which collective bargaining is to be
conducted, the legislative history of the 1947 act is the relevant starting point.
27 "Under the exigencies of war the Nation did utilize what amounted to compulsory arbitration through the instrumentality of the War Labor Board." S. REP.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1947). Senator Wagner, sponsor of the original
NLRA, also seemed to be opposed to compulsory arbitration as a means of settling
labor disputes. See Hearings on Bills to Amend the National Labor Relations Act
Before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at 7 (1939). See also Williams, The Compulsory Settlement of Contract Negotiation
Labor Disputes, 27 TEXAs L. Rrv. 587, 611-12 (1949).
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the negative lessons of that experience undoubtedly influenced Congress in
its attempt to encourage "free" collective bargaining.28 The direct application of official state process to parties to a federally protected effort at
collective bargaining is a characteristic common to both compulsory arbitration and seizure, and to the injunction in Oliver as well. Compulsory
arbitration requires that the parties submit to a government-sponsored
resolution of the dispute by a neutral third party.29 Seizure requires that
the employer continue to produce and the employees to work, both under
state supervision.30 It is arguable that the freedom which Congress sought
to insure includes freedom from direct state interference of this type, rather
than isolation from any and all pressure. Even labor disputes within
Congress' regulatory power are frequently local in character, giving rise to
public demands for state action.8 These conflicting pressures do not have
to be resolved entirely in favor of federal preemption. Where there is a
direct application of state power to the parties, the restraint on federally
protected freedom is patent and the local interest must yield. On the other
hand, when the application of state power is indirect and, as in the present
case, effected through the manipulation of public opinion, a factor present
in many labor disputes,3 2 constraint on the freedom of collective bargaining
will vary with the factual setting. Because indirect pressure may take
several forms,33 the disruptive effect of different types of state-sanctioned
publicity and comment becomes increasingly doubtful and difficult to prove.
But a clear line separating permissible from impermissible state "interference" may be drawn between direct state control over the conduct of
parties to a labor dispute and state attempts to influence that conduct
indirectly. While such a line may at times sanction local action having a
substantial effect on the parties, it will in many doubtful cases protect valid
state interests. The court in the present case seems to have sacrificed un28
After describing this experience, the Senate report on the Taft-Hartley bill
said: "This system, however, tended to emphasize unduly the role of the Government,
and under it employers and labor organizations tended to avoid solving their difficulties by free collective bargaining." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13
(1947). See also 93 CONG. REc. 3835 (1947) (remarks by Senator Taft).
29 Williams, supra note 27, at 588.
30 Cf. id. at 612.
SlWeisenfeld, Labor Di~snte Settlement-Local or Federal Function?, 10 LAB.
L.J. 703, 704 (1959).
3
2 See id. at 704-05.
33 In the instant case state pressure took the form of a full-dress public report
by an investigatory body. It is not uncommon in a labor dispute, however, for public
pressure to be brought to bear on state and municipal executive officials to aid and
encourage settlement. See Weisenfeld, supra note 31, at 704-05. It is true that any
action taken by such an official would lack the formality of the Massachusetts procedure which included the power to subpoena witnesses. But because the court in the
instant case ignored the procedural formalities involved, it is arguable that any
remarks made by such an official reflecting on the merits of the position taken by one
of the parties could, under the holding in the instant case, be enjoined. Such a statement might easily have the same effect on the parties as an administrative report.
Nor would the absence of a legislatively sanctioned act necessarily defeat a suit for
an injunction. Cf. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932) (enjoining governor
from enforcing under martial law the policy of an unconstitutional statute).
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necessarily an important and flexible tool for protecting a strong state interest in dealing with labor relations 34 in order to further what it considered
35
to be congressional intent.

UNFAIR COMPETITION--"'MDETG COMPETITION" DEFENsE
ALLows PRICE DIsc nvRnVATIox To HELP DEALER MEET RETAJL
PRICE OF SEIL.R'S VERTICALLY INTEGRATED COMPETITOR

Super Test Oil Company, a vertically integrated, "non-major" gasoline
distributor, opened a filling station across the street from a station supplied
by Sun Oil Company and sold gasoline at most times substantially below
the price offered by the Sun dealer.' The Sun dealer, an independent
contractor,2 suffered a considerable decline in sales. Being unable to absorb
a retail price cut, he persuaded Sun to drop its tank-wagon price to him.
Since Sun did not drop its price to other dealers in the area until a fullscale price war had developed, the Federal Trade Commission charged
Sun with violating section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act 3 by price
discrimination among its dealers. In defense, Sun asserted that the allowance was a good faith price reduction to meet competition, permitted by
section 2(b). 4 The Commission rejected the defense on the ground that
it is available to a seller only to meet "direct" competition; Sun could have
reduced its price to one station only if Super Test had offered gasoline to
34
On the basis of the decision in the instant case, statutes in fourteen states,
similar to that of Massachusetts in allowing the mediation board to issue a report,
would appear to be inoperative as to industries subject to the NLRA. See ALA.
CODE tit. 26, § 381 (1958) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-95 (1958) ; HAWAII REV.
LAws § 88-16 (1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 20, 27, 28 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1961) ; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 90.1-90.14 (1949) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 30, §§ 15E15L (Supp. 1961) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, §§ 3, 4, 8 (1957) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 273:26 (1955); N.D. CENTURY CODE § 34-10-04 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE 84129.02
(Page 1954) ; OLA. STAT. ANN. tit 40, § 7 (1954) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-10-1
(1956) ; S.C. CODE § 40-301 (1952) ; S.D. CODE § 17.1003 (Supp. 1960).
35 See instant case at 67.

1 The differential ranged from 2 to 7 cents per gallon. A two-cent differential
between major and nonmajor brands is generally considered to be insufficient in
itself to draw patronage away from dealers of either brand. See DE CHAZEAU &
KAHN, INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

466 (Petroleum

Monograph Series No. 3, 1959) ; H.R. REP. No. 1423, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955) ;
Note, Competition in Gasoline Retailing: A Price War, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 644, 645

(1953).
2 The dealer either owned his station or leased it from a party other than Sun.
Sun controlled the dealer by a products contract. See Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955,
957 (1959). While the court noted five types of relationships between a dealer and
his supplier, Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465, 467 n.2 (5th Cir. 1961), basically
they may be classified into three categories: stations owned or leased by the company
and operated by employees (Super Test), those owned or leased by the company and
operated by an independent dealer under another lease given by the company, and those
owned by the dealer or leased from someone other than the company (Sun). CASSADY, PRICE MAKING AND PRICE BEHAVIOR IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 236 (Petroleum Monograph Series No. 1, 1954).
349 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958), amending 38 Stat 730 (1914).
449 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958).
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that station at a price lower than Sun's. The Fifth Circuit set aside the
Commission's cease and desist order and upheld Sun's defense on the
ground that, since Sun competed with Super Test for the ultimate consumer market and marketed its gasoline through a filling station in active
competition with the Super Test station, Sun was meeting in good faith
the lower price of a competitor when it dropped its tank-wagon price to
the one station. Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
granted, 368 U.S. 984 (1962).
Underlying the Robinson-Patman amendment of the Clayton Act was
a congressional concern for the plight of small businessmen unable to compete with larger retailers receiving lower prices from a common supplier.5
To protect these small merchants, Congress found it necessary to amend
both the statutes substantive offense6 and its "meeting competition"
defense. 7 The courts have interpreted the revised substantive offense with
a view to this congressional intent 8 and, by imposing limitations on the
More specifically, the statute was amended to protect small grocers unable to
compete with chain stores receiving volume discounts. Hearings on Bills to Amend
the Clayton Act Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Comnittee, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1956); 79 CONG. REc. 9078 (1935) (remarks of Rep.
Patman); FTC, Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 53-65 (1935).
6 Section 2 of the old Clayton Act was aimed at eliminating predatory practices
of large sellers whose regional price cuts, often below cost, enabled them to eliminate
smaller local sellers. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). The
Clayton Act standard of injury was found to be inadequate for the new congressional
purpose. S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936). Consequently, § 2(a) was
amended to prohibit discriminations which "injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefits of such discriminations" as well as those which may "substantially . . . lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce"-the old Clayton Act standard.
See generally Ausrrn, PRicE DiscMmiNATioN 11 (2d rev. ed. 1959); Rowe, The
Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 CoLum. L.
REv. 1059, 1067-74 (1957).
7.The Clayton Act excused discriminations "made in good faith to meet competition." Ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). The language was changed, so that the
meeting of competition "in a particular community" would no longer be a defense.
80 CONG. REc. 3113, 3119 (1936) ; see AusiN, PaRcE DIscnR ImNATIoN 93 (2d rev. ed.
1959).
8 In situations akin to the instant case, where discriminations have allegedly
injured competition in the secondary line-competition among buyers of the same
seller-the courts have uniformly held that the discriminations need not in fact result
in the requisite 2(a) injury to competition. A "reasonable possibility" of injury is
sufficient. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945) ; see E. Edelmann
& Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958);
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 792 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952); Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253
(7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957) (Commission's finding of probable
injury upheld despite testimony by purchasers that they were not injured). Conpare
Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, supra at 738, 739, 742 (1945) ("reasonable possibility"
and "probability" of injury used interchangeably), with FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
334 U.S. 37, 55-61 (1948) (dissenting opinion) (standard should be "probability,"
not "reasonable possibility" as established by the majority). On the other hand, the
mere possibility of injury has generally been insufficient in primary-line cases-where
the discriminations allegedly injured competition among sellers. See Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. FTC, 289 F2d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 1961) (actual present injury required; mere
possibility of future adverse effect insufficient); Mirneapolis-Honeyvell Regulator
Co. v. FTC, supra at 790; Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945). But see Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block
& Gravel Co., 269 F2d 950, 957 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
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new "meeting competition" defense, have sought to protect the parties
injured by a seller's discriminations rather than to stimulate competition
when an interpretation would not achieve both purposes. Thus, to be excused under 2(b), a discriminatory price may meet but not undercut a
competitor's price0 and must be retaliatory, not aggressive.10 In addition,
price discriminations must be temporary to meet a competitor's price to a
particular customer, not a permanent duplication of a competitor's pricing
1
system. '
While the section 2(b) defense has been allowed without proof of an
actual offer to any one of the seller's customers when discriminations have
allegedly injured competition among sellers 12-primary-line cases-the instant decision is the first in which the defense was granted in the absence
of an actual offer in a secondary-line case, where a discrimination has
injured competition among buyers of the same seller. In Standard Oil Co.
v. FTC,13 the Supreme Court held that Standard might sell to certain
gasoline jobbers at prices lower than those it offered to retail stations in the
The Atlas court held that a "reasonable possibility" was sufficient, but the AnheuserBusch court distinguished the case as one where the seller's prices were predatory,
not set with "proper restraint" See generally AUsTiN, PRIcE DISCR!mINATION 40-57
(2d rev. ed. 1959); A Symposium on the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Nw. U.L. REv.
196, 213-24 (1954).
9 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 241-42, 247 n.14 (1951); Samuel H.
Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, 379-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945) ;
Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929) (decided under the old Clayton Act) ; Gerber Prods. Co.
v. Beech-Nut
Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
1
0 Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 826 (1959). This requirement has been criticized by commentators. See
ArIxY GEN. NATL CoMM. A.NTITRUST REP. 184-85 (1955) (defense should not be
restricted to retaining customers).
11 See FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 725 (1948) ; FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
The sellers in these cases could not adopt a competitor's "unlawful" pricing system.
Cf. C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
941 (1958). Niehoff could not defend a rebate price system favoring quantity buyers
merely because other suppliers in the industry employed similar systems. And too,
a seller lacks "good faith" if he fails to show facts which would lead a reasonable
man to believe that his discriminatory prices would in fact meet a competitor's
"lawful" lower price. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., supra at 759-60. But see
Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956), in which the court held that
the "good faith" requirement does not require that the seller must prove that his
competitor's prices were "lawful." The Attorney General's Committee approved a
"reasonable man" test for determining whether a seller has acted in "good faith,"
insisting that this requirement should not amount to a burden of proof. Arr'Y GEN.
NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 181-82 (1955).
2
1 See Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955),
350 U.S. 991 (1956) (dictum). To meet lower wholesale ice cream
cert.
pricesdenied,
in the Los
Angeles area, Arden reduced its prices to all its dealers. The court of
appeals upheld a finding that Arden's price reductions were made in good faith to meet
the equally low prices of its competitors, although there was no evidence of any actual
offers to Arden's customers. Since the court determined that there was in the first
place no violation of § 2(a), the finding as to § 2(b) was dictum. To the same effect,
see Gerber Prods. Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916, 921 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958) (dictum); cf. American Co-op. Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153
F.2d 907 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946) (seller permitted to discriminate among its agents to meet competition at the retail level).
13 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
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area only if on remand it was found that a competitor had underbid Standard's price to the jobbers. This rule was applied at the service station level
in Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co.,14 where a district court held that
Texas could not discriminate in favor of certain lessee-operated stations 15
in a gas war area, since a competitor had not made a lower offer to these
stations. The Enterprise court established the principle that section 2(b)
enables a supplier to meet competition only at his own level and does not
permit him to discriminate to help his buyers meet their competition at the
retail level. 16
Generally, oil companies compete by means of actual offers for the
accounts of wholesale-jobbers 17 -independent businessmen who buy gasoline from refiners in large lots and resell to retailers or other buyers.' 8
However, due to short-term station and equipment leases, 1 products
contracts, 20 and the fact that a filling station employs facilities adapted to
only one company's products, 21 there is only sporadic competition among
oil companies for the accounts of established stations.P Because of this
lack of competition for stations' accounts, the present court found Standard
14 136 F. Supp. 420 (D. Conn. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F2d 457 (Zd
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957), Note, 66 YAL.u L.J. 935 (1957) (criticizing the decision).
15 The stations were of the second general type classified in note 2 supra. See
Brief for Petitioner, p. 12, instant case; Note, 66 YALE LJ. 935, 937 (1957).
16 136 F. Supp. at 421.
1' Such competition can be seen in the facts surrounding the Standard Oil litigation. For a detailed account of the competitive situation in that case, see Comment,
19 U. Cxi. L. REv. 58 (1951).
18 CAssAIY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 199.
19 A lease of storage tanks and gas pumps is not an illegal tying arrangement
under § 3 of the Clayton Act if there is no covenant in the contract forbidding the
lessee from selling another's brand, even if the lessee covenants not to dispense another's brand with the lessor's equipment. FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463

(1923).

20 Even without an exclusive dealership clause, the products contract in effect
establishes one oil company as the sole supplier to the station, thereby tying the
station to the supplier. See CAssADY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 236-38. A similar
effect is attained by the use of "paint contracts" whereby a supplier paints the dealer's
station with the company's colors. Id. at 237 n.4. Products contracts, which contain exclusive dealership clauses, have been invalidated under § 3 of the Clayton Act as illegal
tying arrangements whose effect "may be to substantially lessen competition" Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). For variations of these contracts
and the courts' attitude towards them under § 3 of the Clayton Act, see Bermingham,
Legal Aspects of Petroleum Marketing Under Federal and Califortia Laws, 7 U.C.
L.A.L. Rxv. 161, 187-96 (1960).
21
Instant case at 476-78; see DE CHAZEAU & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 1, at
480; Note, 66 YALE L.J. 935, 943 (1957). In Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293, 323 (1949), Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, said: "[Tlhe retailer in
this industry is only a conduit . . . a means by which the oil companies compete
to get the business of the ultimate consumer .

.

.

. The retail stations . . . are the

instrumentalities through which competition for this ultimate market is waged."
22The court in the instant case was of the opinion, see instant case at 476-78, and
the Enterprise court implied, see 136 F. Supp. at 421, that it is a fiction to speak of
price competition at the level of sales by oil companies to service stations. But see
CASSADY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 58-61 (to reach the market petroleum firms must
adopt an aggressive policy to acquire stations' accounts); 1 WHrrNEY, ANTIRUST
PoLiciEs 178 (1958) (suppliers do compete for the accounts of efficient dealers).
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Oil's direct offer requirement factually distinguishable 2 and concluded that
demanding such an offer would excise the defense from the statute when a
supplier is faced with retail level competition from a vertically integrated
company 2 4 Since a vertically integrated company elects to reach the retail
market through company-owned outlets rather than by seeking accounts
of existing outlets, it would be unrealistic to expect an actual offer from
Super Test.2 5 Reading Standard Oil as requiring proof only that a competitor's lower prices threatened a seller with loss of a customer, 26 the court
concluded that Sun had qualified for the defense without an actual offer
from Super Test.27 But the statement in Standard Oil relied upon by the
instant court as a justification for applying the defense was made in dictum;
the issue in Standard Oil was the nature of the defense when its availability
was assumed, not which competitor's prices a seller may meet by discrimination under section 2(b) .2 8 The mere fact that a seller has shown as great
a need for the defense as was shown in Standard Oil does not in itself
seem to warrant the granting of the defense: other limitations have been
placed on the defense which a seller must satisfy even if he has been
threatened with the loss of a customer.2 Finding no authority or legislative
history for its reading of the word "competitor" in section 2(b) as including a concern cutting prices at the retail level, 30 the present court, relying
on the canon that section 2(b) must be interpreted in the light of individual
competitive situations,3 ' nonetheless rejected the Enterprise principle by
23

Instant case at 473.

at 476.
25 See instant case at 472-73. It would be especially unrealistic to expect an
actual offer in the present case: Super Test had an existing outlet right across the
street from the Sun dealer.
26 In Standard Oil the Court stated that the core of a § 2(b) defense is "...
that
wherever a lawful lower price of a competitor threatens to deprive a seller of a
customer, the seller, to retain that customer, may in good faith meet that lower price."
340 U.S. at 242. (Emphasis added.)
27 Instant case at 473. "'Clearly, a seller's need for a lower price in response
to a decrease in his sales is the same whether the decrease occurs because his purchasers switch to a price cutting competitor or because [his purchasers] are unable
to protect their share of the retail market from distributors of a rival product."'
Id. at 474, quoting Note, 66 YALE L.J. 935, 939 (1957). The danger of loss of a
customer at the time of the discrimination was dearly established in the instant case.
Despite the discrimination, the favored dealer went out of business. See instant case
at 470.
28 See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
29 See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text
30
Instant case at 476.
31 See instant case at 471, 478, 481. The court's use of this principle, however,
extends beyond past applications. In cases where sellers established basing-point
pricing systems so as to present their customers with the same price as a competitor
operating from a different base, the Supreme Court rejected the sellers' contentions
that the resulting discriminatory prices were made to meet the equally low prices of
these competitors on the ground that the act places emphasis upon individual competitive situations rather than on a general system of competition. FTC v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 725 (1948) ; FTC v. A. E. Staley, 324 U.S. 746, 753 (1945).
Whereas in the latter cases the principle was established as a reason for denying
§ 2(b) to a seller discriminating only to meet a competitor's pricing system instead
of a competitor's price to a particular customer, the instant court fashioned the principle
as a direction the Commission must follow in determining when a seller has qualified
for the defense.
2id.
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reasoning that the result of its decision would advance the purposes of both
32
the Robinson-Patman Act and antitrust legislation in general.
The court determined that to permit Sun to discriminate would benefit
the small merchants Congress sought to protect by the Robinson-Patman
Act, because Sun would then be able to protect the favored dealer from
destructive competition by Super Test.3 3 There can be no quarrel with this
finding, for if no action had been taken by Sun, the favored dealer would
have been virtually unable to withstand Super Test's aggressive price

policy.3 4 However, while the basic goal of the draftsmen of the RobinsonPatman Act was to preserve the independent merchant as an economic
entity, Congress sought to achieve this purpose only by enacting a statute
aimed at assuring that each of a seller's customers receive identical prices
so as to have an equal chance to compete. To justify a discrimination on
the ground that it has enabled one small merchant to remain in business
conflicts with the very letter of the statute, for, by its terms, the statute
does not attempt to preserve one small merchant at the expense of handicapping others, or to shield these merchants from the rigors of retail-level
competition. 35 Although the court denounced the Commission's interpretation of the defense as focusing on injury to particular competitors-the
nonfavored stations-rather than the health of the competitive process,3 6
the court's result is subject to the same criticism for focusing on injury
to the favored dealer.
While admitting that the discrimination resulted in injury to the nonfavored dealers, the court nonetheless argued that its decision would, in
the long run, benefit these merchants by localizing the price war. The
court reasoned that forcing Sun to make an area price cut so that no
32
"[E]xcept where Congress has told [them] . . . not to," courts must reconcile
an interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act "with the broader antitrust policies
that have been laid down by Congress." Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S.
61, 74 (1953).
&3 Instant case at 479.
34 There is not enough consumer allegiance to enable a station engaged in a gas
war to compete effectively by any means other than lowering his prices. See CAssADY,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 262-66; Note, supra note 1 passim.
35 The very problem which led to the enactment of the Robinson-Patman amendment indicates that Congress sought to preserve the independent merchant as an
economic entity only by assuring that merchants in general receive uniform treatment
by their supplier, not by seeking to protect these merchants from retail competition
after36they have received equal prices. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
Instant case at 481. The act itself has been criticized as focusing on injury
to competitors instead of injury to competition. See H.R. REP. No. 1422, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 5-6 (1949). See generally ENvARDs, THE PRICE DisCRIMlNAnoN LA:w
518-45 (1959). Compare ATT'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 164-65 (1955)
(incidental hardships on individual businessmen should be subservient to competitive
process itself), and H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 5-6, 26-27
(1936) (minority report) (Robinson-Patman protects the small merchant at the
consumer's expense), with Hearings on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act Before the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1935) (remarks of
Rep. Patman) (laws must be passed to protect the independent grocer from corporate
chains), and S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936) (injury to competitor
victimized by discrimination more important concern than general injury to competitive
conditions). It likeise has been criticized for encouraging price rigidity. Bums,
A Summary of the Study of the Antitrust Laws, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 695, 711 (1956);
Note, 59 YALE L.. 158, 159 (1949).
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dealer would be affected by a discriminatory price would, by expanding
the area of the price war, subject the dealers' margins to further compression 7 Since the discrimination did not in fact stop the price war's spread,
the court's post hoc prediction of the market reaction to a discriminatory
cut is of doubtful validity. In addition, the Senate committee which approved the Enterprise decision indicated that if gasoline retailers are
to be protected from price wars, the limitation should be on their durationby forbidding any subsidization-not on the area affected-by fostering
discrimination.3 8 As a means of attaining the basic goals of the RobinsonPatman Act, the committee's view clearly indicates a preference for an
interpretation of section 2(b) which would enforce the immediate function
of the statute, not one which protects one merchant to the detriment of
others. When the defense is granted to a seller faced with the loss of a
customer to a competitor making a lower offer, the seller's nonfavored
customers are subjected to no injury other than that which they already
faced. Since the favored customer has already received a lower offer, with
or without the discrimination, he is able to undersell the nonfavored
dealers 9 In the instant case, however, since the favored dealer did not
receive a lower offer elsewhere, he was able to undersell the nonfavored stations only after Sun dropped its price. Should a blanket price cut enlarge
the area of the gas war, the station owners would at least receive identical
prices with which to compete in a manner consistent with the function of
37

See instant case at 474, 480.

as
S. REP. No. 2810, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1956).
3
9 Aside from its interpretation of the legislative history of § 2(b), this was the
justification the Standard Oil Court offered for finding § 2(b) to be an absolute
defense in the face of a direct offer despite the concern of Congress for small merchants. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 250 (1951). However, the
injury to small businessmen resulting from permitting the §2(b) defense in any
secondary-line case has inspired several heretofore unsuccessful bills designed to
limit the defense. "[T]hese independent merchants are screaming and they have a
The Captain Kidd's [sic] in business are having a field day since
right to scream ....
that Standard Oil decision in 1951 . . . ." Rep. Patman in Hearingson Bills to Amend
Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Holse
Judiciary Committee, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 243, 245 (1956). See generally Rowe,
supranote 6, at 1085-88; Comment, 8 KAN. L. REv. 630, 641-43 (1960). The proposed
bills would overrule the Standard Oil holding that the defense is absolute in all cases
and base 'its availability on the degree of injury resulting from the defense's application. See H.R. REP. No. 2202, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); S. R . No. 2817,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) ; 102 CONG. REc. 10028 (1956) (remarks of Rep. Patman).
Thus the defense would be denied if the discrimination "substantially lessened" competition, but granted if the resulting injury were less than substantial. H.R. 11,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) states that "unless the effect of the discrimination may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce . . . it shall be a complete defense for a seller to show that his lower
price . . . to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor . . . ." But discriminations also violate §2(a) when
they "injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with the customers of either
of them. . . ." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958), amending 38 Stat.
730 (1914). Thus it appears that §2(b) would remain an absolute defense to discriminations causing only the latter type injury. See Comment, 8 KAN. L. REv.
630, 643 (1960); Symposium, supra note 8, at 265. The proposed amendment has
met mixed reactions from commentators. Compare remarks of Messrs. Adams and
Schwartz in ATe'y GEN.

NAT'L

Commis.

ANTITRUST REP. 185

(1955)

(the Standard

Oil holding permits discriminations not derived from superior efficiency), %oithRowe,
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the statute the court was interpreting. In addition, competition on the retail
level, which the court sought to stimulate for the consumers' benefit, would
be stimulated in an even greater area.
The court reasoned that permitting Sun to discriminate would stimulate retail-level competition by providing Sun with an opportunity to break
away from the rigid pricing practices characteristic of an oligopolistic
industry.40 Admittedly, any application of the section 2(b) defense results
in the immediate stimulation of competition. However, the industry's
uniform prices, the existence of "real" competition only at the retail level,
and a new entrant's need to gain a market foothold by integrating and
employing an aggressive price policy are the results not only of the economics of the industry, but of the major companies' control over both the
existing retail outlets and production facilities. 41 In the interest of assuring
the active competition that the court sought to foster, basic antitrust policy
favors free entry to all markets. It has been said that the essence of antitrust policy with regard to distributive practices is to assure the consumer
the benefits of vigorous competition at all levels of distribution. 42 Perhaps,
then, a major distributor which has itself contributed to a new entrant's
inability to obtain existing outlets to the consumer market and has on the
whole stifled active competition both for stations' accounts and at the retail
level should be precluded from combating this new entrant by discriminating to the detriment of its own independent dealers. By sanctioning the
discrimination in the present case, the court has provided the major companies with an additional means of selectively controlling entrance into the
industry by eliminating this competition at the least expense. In the name
of antitrust policy the court has strengthened the majors' already dominant
market position, giving them, as well as sellers in other industries, a further
incentive to employ tying arrangements, and has tolerated a practice bordering on price fixing.43 The gasoline industry is a peculiar one in which to
spra note 6, 1087 n.172 (1957). The Department of Justice and House Judiciary
Committee opposed the amendment, finding it inconsistent with the Sherman Act.
See H.R. Ra. No. 869, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1949). But since the bills base
the availability of § 2(b) on considerations of the effect on competition resulting from
the application of the defense, they do not affect the determination of whether the
defense is available to meet retail-level competition. The bills do not define, clarify,
or limit
the "competitor" whose prices can be met under § 2(b).
40
Instant case at 474-75.
41 See CAssADY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 236-39; 1 WHITNEY, AN.tRUSr PoLICIEs
125-31, 178-79 (1958).
42
ArT' GEN. NATL. Comm. ANrRUrS REP. 190 (1955).
43 Price fixing is illegal per se. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S., 150, 223 (1940). Moreover, it is not necessary that there be an express agreement, for a conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence. FTC v. Pacific
States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52 (1927) ; National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F2d
825 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd o other grounds, 352 U.S. 419 (1957); Fort Howard
Paper Co. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 899 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946). In
the instant case, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the
examiner's finding that there was an agreement. It determined that the characteristics of the market place, not Sun, established the price set by the dealer upon receiving
the discount. Instant case at 483. Nonetheless, the decision sanctions "gentlemen's
agreements," if not actual ones, and encourages a supplier to investigate another's
tank-wagon price so as to compute his own allowance to his dealers.

1962]

RECENT CASES

deviate from the past policy of strictly interpreting section 2(b) against a
seller's interests and in favor of the injured parties4
The industry's
tying arrangements were recognized by the Senate committee that approved
the Enterprise case as one cause of the gasoline dealer's less than independent status.4 5 The court permitted Sun to discriminate because these
tying arrangements result in the industry's only real competition being
waged at the retail level. But these very arrangements place the nonfavored
stations under a handicap which small merchants in other industries do not
face when dealing with a discriminating seller, for the stations are unable
to seek gasoline elsewhere.
Since the court found an area price cut to be an unlikely business
alternative, the underlying reason for its decision seems to have been a
fear that Sun would integrate vertically to compete with Super Test if not
allowed to discriminate. 46 That such a consequence would be inconsistent
with the ultimate goals of the Robinson-Patman Act can hardly be questioned, for vertical integration would eliminate independent gasoline retailers. However, the court's fear of this consequence has little basis in
fact; denial of the section 2(b) defense in Enterprise did not bring about
vertical integration. Nor is fear of this consequence a sound justification
for excusing a discrimination in any case, for vertical integration is a possible consequence whenever section 2(b) is denied to a seller who thinks
it essential to lower prices in one area. Significantly, fear of this consequence did not prevent the Supreme Court from outlawing exclusive dealership contracts in the gasoline industry, even though the Court was acutely
aware of a supplier's need to reach the consumer market.47 Moreover, the
court's purpose of giving consumers the benefits of active competition rather
than those of buying from particular merchants could adequately be achieved
by leaving the control of vertical integration to the sanctions of the Sher44

See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text.
REP. No. 2810, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1956). By relying on a case
in which a seller was permitted to discriminate among its agents, see note 12 supra,
the instant court likewise recognized the less than independent status of the gasoline
dealer. Instant case at 475 n.27.
46
See instant case at 478-80. The court also criticized an area price cut on the
ground that it could lead to a violation of § 2(a) of the act. In FTC v. AnheuserBusch Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960), the Court held that for a price to be discriminatory,
the seller's nonfavored customers need not be in competition with those receiving
lower prices. It appears, however, that a seller who made an area price cut to avoid
violating § 2(a) in a secondary-line case would not thereby become liable in a primaryline case. Such a cut lacks two elements without which the courts have been loath
to find a violation of § 2(a) in primary-line cases-unreasonably low prices and a
predatory intent on the seller's part. See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., supra at
552; cases cited note 8 supra.
47
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 319-21 (1949) (separate
opinion of Douglas, J.); id. at 323-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Moreover, were
Sun to integrate only at the location of the one station most seriously affected by
Super Tests price cutting and cut prices at this outlet, Sun might not avoid liability
for discrimination. See Danko v. Shell Oil Co., 115 F. Supp. 886 (E.D.N.Y. 1953),
in which the court found "real" competition between an independent station owner
and Shell, which competed through a company-owned station, that would permit a
cause of action under § 2(a). The complaint was dismissed on other grounds. Compare American Serum Co-op. Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946).
45 S.
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man Act 48 or the more specific standards of section 7 of the Clayton Act,
where applicable. 49
The court did, however, cautiously limit its novel interpretation of
"competitor" in section 2(b) to include only supplier-retailers.5 0 The
court's reliance both on its finding that the only "real" competition is
among, but not for, service stations and on the fact that Super Test could
not realistically be expected to make an actual offer, negates the possibility
of extending its interpretation to all cases in which a seller is faced with
the loss of a customer by retail-level competition either by retail outlets of
a price-cutting supplier who chooses not to make an offer to the seller's
customers or by retailers' cutting prices unaided by their suppliers. In the
former case, even under the court's reading, Standard Oil expressly requires an actual offer from a competitor who could be expected to make
one.51 In the latter case, since the court rejected the Enterprise decision
because the only "real" competition in the gasoline industry is at the retail
level, the Enterprise principle remains unchallenged in industries where
there is active competition on more than one level. An extension of the
court's interpretation to this case would not comport with the court's goal
of seeking to encourage active competition. Rather, reading section 2(b)
as giving a seller in any industry the power to discriminate to meet the
competition of resourceful merchants who are unaided by their suppliers
would deter these merchants from engaging in active competition.5r2 For
in competing, they would have to cope not only with other small merchants
but with larger suppliers able to absorb a price cut under cost.
48 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
49 64 Stat 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
50 See instant case at 474, 481. It also appears that the court would not grant the

defense whenever a major supplier suffered a decline in sales from retail level competition, but only when the supplier was about to lose a station. See note 27 supra
and accompanying text. There was no such showing in Enterprise.
51 Explicit language in the Standard Oil opinion indicates that when such offers
can be expected, they are demanded. See 340 U.S. at 244, 250. The fact that a
seller could always find another supplier willing to undercut his price to his customers
made the original discrimination section of the Clayton Act practically unenforceable.
AuSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION 93 (2d rev. ed. 1959). Assuming, of course, that
the supplier cutting prices did not reduce his prices to every customer he serviced so
that there would be a discrimination under §2(a), it appears that a seller in such a
situation would have a remedy under § 2(a) and therefore would not need to discriminate himself. See note 46 supra. The threatened loss of a customer which the
instant court found to be a basic prerequisite for the availability of §2(b) would
appear to be a sufficient injury to establish a cause of action under § 2(a). See cases
cited note 8 supra. Other commentators have, however, seen possible extensions of the
decision. See 62 COLUm. L. REv. 171, 174 (1962) ; 75 HARv.L. REv. 429, 432 (1961).
In the gasoline industry, the probability of an offer from a major supplier varies
inversely with the extent of the present supplier's control. See notes 2, 21 mtpra;
CAssADY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 236-38.
5-2
See Note, 66 YALE LJ. 935, 942 (1957).

